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REMEDY FOR THE RELUCTANT PARENT

inevitable that courts in many jurisdictions will consider cases involving not
only the physician's liability in unsuccessful surgical sexual sterilizations, but
also the liability of pharmacists for negligently filling oral contraceptive prescriptions174 and the liability of manufacturers for the negligent design or
fabrication of birth control devices.17 5 It is crucial that the courts not be led
by the apparent equities of the situation to decide these cases of first impression in such a way as to foreclose future recoveries as a matter of law.176
The liberal offset rule applied in Troppi and followed in Coleman v. Gar2'ison7 permits the finders of fact in each case to balance the wide range of
benefits and detriments that may arise in connection with the birth of an unplanned child. Allowing a case-by-case determination of the recovery in this
manner better comports with established theories of American jurisprudence
than does excluding further consideration of claimed injuries because of a
judicially perceived public accord.
MICHAEL LANNING Fox

DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE FICTION IN FLORIDA:
THE NEED FOR SPECIFICS
Disregard of the corporate fiction is the exception rather than the rule.'
It is a judicial remedy designed to prevent abusive utilization of the corporate
form.2 Florida courts have delineated various tests to be used in identifying
those situations in which the corporate fiction will be disregarded. The circumstances requiring application of this doctrine of disregard are described
by such verbal characterizations 3 as alter ego, instrumentality, identity, and
174. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
175. Courts have recently held that in most instances there is no warranty of the effectiveness of birth control pills. Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 336 F. Supp.
961 (W.D. Okla. 1972); Whittington v. Eli Lilley 9- Co., 333 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.W. Va. 1971).
176. Compare Hays v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. App.), reu'd, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex.
1972), with Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App. 1973).
177. 281 A.2d 616 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971).
1. E.g., Robert's Fish Farm v. Spencer, 153 So. 2d 718, 721 (Fla. 1963); Advertects,
Inc. v. Sawyer Indus., 84 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1955).
2. The concept of the corporation as a separate legal entity is employed in a manner
violative of its intended purposes and hence will be disregarded when used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime. See, e.g., United States v.
Milwaukee Refrigeration Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 266 (C.C.E.D. Avis. 1905); State ex rel.
Continental Distilling Sales Co. v. Vocelle, 158 Fla. 100, 27 So. 2d 728 (1946).
3. Justice Cardozo, referring to use of the instrumentality rule in cases involving
parent-subsidiary relationships, stated: "The whole problem . . . is still enveloped in the
mists of metaphor. Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices
to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it." Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y.
84, 94-95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
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subterfuge.4 Because the situations in which the corporate fiction will be disregarded are described in such broad generalities, 5 the labels are of limited
value to the attorney trying to ascertain whether the fiction will be disregarded
in a specific fact situation. Nevertheless, it is this very generalization that
gives the remedy its strength and vitality, for such generalization permits
flexible employment of the remedy as a panacea for a wide variety of wrongs.
Although the doctrine of disregard is an equitable remedy, it is not
limited to equity jurisdiction, nor is it barred by the existence of alternative
legal remedies. 7 In fact, the frauds and wrongs for which the doctrine may
supply relief are often independently actionable under other theories of
liability. For example, an action in deceit will normally lie in a situation
where the corporate fiction is disregarded and unlimited liability is imposed
on a shareholder or affiliate corporation.8 Thus, the doctrine has important
utility as an independent remedy.
This note explains the policies behind the doctrine of disregard and
analyzes the situations suitable for employment of the doctrine in an effort
to identify the specific requirements that must exist before a court will
pierce a corporate veil. Because most Florida cases dealing with the doctrine
of disregard concern credit transactions and because credit transactions involve
the conflict between the policies behind limited liability and those calling
for disregard of the corporate form, such transactions are emphasized. 9

4. Professor Henn lists thirty-eight such epithets. H.

HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONs

250

n.2 (2d ed. 1970).
5. For examples of various descriptions that defy precise analysis, see House of Koscot
Dev. Corp. v. American Line Cosmetics, Inc., 468 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying Florida
law); Advertects, Inc. v. Saywer Indus., 84 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1955); Sirmons v. Arnold Lumber
Co., 167 So. 2d 588 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
6. See, e.g., Barnes v. Liebig, 146 Fla. 219, 1 So. 2d 2417 (1941); Bellaire Sec. Corp. %.
Brown, 124 Fla. 47, 84, 168 So. 625, 633 (1936).
7. See House of Koscot Dev. Corp. v. American Line Cosmetics, Inc., 468 F.2d 64 (5th
Cir. 1972) (applying Florida law). In Koscot two alternative theories were submitted to
the jury, the first based on the alter ego theory, the second on the theory that a defendant
had tortiously interfered with plaintiff's contract. Many courts require fraud to be present
before the doctrine will be applied in consensual credit transactions. See, e.g., Codomo v.
Emanuel, 91 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1956); Advertects v. Sawyer Indus., 84 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1955).
See generally Note, Disregarding the Corporate Entity: Contract Claims, 28 Omo ST. L.J.
441, 443-46 (1967).
8. The doctrine may be more advantageous than a deceit action in this situation because
of the possible existence of differing statutes of limitations or difficulties in proving material
misrepresentation, detrimental reliance, or intent. Similarly, in an action for breach of
contract or warranty, proof of a contract or promise with the defendant when the actual
agreement is between the plaintiff and the corporation might be hindered by the statute
of frauds.
9. Although the doctrine of disregard is applicable to all corporations, it is most
frequently applied to close corporations and corporations occupying a parent-subsidiary
relationship. A subsidiary corporation is similar to a close corporation in that generally
both have a small number of shareholders. In fact, the parent corporation often is the
sole shareholder of the subsidiary, creating a situation similar to that encountered in a
one-man corporation. The major distinction between these types of corporations is that
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PoLIcIEs INVOLVED IN DISREGARDING THE CORroRATE FICTION

Although limited liability has not always been available, it is presently
the major motive for incorporation. 10 Limited liability was granted to encourage investment of risk capital in needed enterprises." The legal invention
of the corporation with attendant limited liability for shareholders has been
cited as the major factor contributing to our present high standard of living,
2
and consequently it is accorded a favored position in the law.'
Because limited liability is the basic characteristic that distinguishes a controlling shareholder from a principal, the policy behind limited liability must
be considered whenever a corporate obligation resulting from a credit transaction is sought to be imposed on a shareholder. 3 There are two types of
credit transactions: consensual (contract) and nonconsensual (tort). Consensual credit cases generally involve principles of assumption of the risk,
estoppel, and limited liability, which favor adherence to the corporate fiction.'. Abuse of the corporate privilege may, however, militate in favor of disthe subsidiary corporation, unlike the close corporation, is usually commercially dependent
on its stockholder. Because of the similarity in economic structures, standards applicable
to one are usually applicable to the other. See generally H. HENN, supra note 4, §§147-48.
The frequency of application of the doctrine to these corporations is attributable to
economic realities, as the shareholders in both types are more likely to be able to exercise
the control or create the misleading situations that trigger application of the doctrine.
These economic realities have always existed, but until recently corporate statutes have
failed to distinguish the close corporation and the parent-subsidiary corporation from the
larger publicly held corporation. Thus, close corporations have been subjected to the
same standards as publicly held corporations. See text accompanying notes 160-178 infra.
Because Florida has enacted separate standards for close corporations and because of the
economic realities that make the doctrine particularly applicable to them, this note will
emphasize close corporations.
10. English common law provided for the granting of charters of incorporation, but
denied shareholders limited liability. 8 W. HoLDswoRTH, A HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 203
(1926). Special legislative acts and royal charters were the source of the first grants of limited
liability in England, but the privilege was allowed only to corporations of "semi-public
nature such as a canal or railroad." Dodd, The Evolution of Limited Liability in American
Industry: Massachusetts, 61 HAgv. L. Rv. 1351 (1948). In the United States after the
Colonial Revolution, however, even semi-public enterprises were unable to obtain limited
liability. Id. at 1352. Florida first granted the privilege to most corporations in 1868, FLA.
STAT. ANN. §608.44 (1970), History and Source of Law, while California refused to grant
limited liability to corporations until 1930. CAL. CoNST. art. XII, §3 (1879) provided for
unlimited personal liability for shareholders, and it was not repealed until Nov. 4, 1930.
11. See Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 Lw &=CoNTESXp. PROB. 473 (1953); Rankin, The Endless Problem of Corporate
Personality, 32 CoLIm. L. Rv. 643, 654 (1932); Note, Inadequate Capitalization as a Basis
for Shareholder Liability: The California Approach and a Recommendation, 45 S. CAL. L.
REv. 823, 834 (1972).
12. 1. WoRmsa,
DIsmRGARD OF THE CORPORATE FIC'rION AND ALLmD CORPORATION
PROBLENMS 2 (1924).
13. See generally Note, supra note 7.
14. Contract cases are considered to be consensual credit transactions because the
contracting party has consented to do business with the corporation. The doctrine of assumption of the risk exists because the contracting party has voluntarily consented to contract with the corporation, realizing that the corporation alone will be responsible for any
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regarding the corporate fiction and consequent limitations on shareholder
liability. In nonconsensual credit cases, only the strong policy of limited
liability supports a separate corporate entity concept while public protection
arguments15 are advanced to justify application of the doctrine of disregard. 16
Many cases involving application of the doctrine of disregard do not involve conflicts with the limited liability policy. Taxation questions, for
example, involve constitutional issues and fiscal policies relating to the amount
of tax due rather than liability for taxes owed.17 Jurisdictional problems concerning service of process involve questions of due process and minimal contacts. "' Also, cases in which corporations attempt to evade technical wording
of statutes raise questions of legislative intent, just as the issue of enforceability of an injunction against an affiliate corporation or shareholder in-

breaches of contract that may occur. Similarly, because of the contracting party's assumed
ability to protect himself by diligent investigation and because the limited liability aspects
of the corporation are considered to be within the contemplation of the parties, the doctrine
of estoppel may apply as well.
15. Tort cases are considered noncensensual credit transactions because the tort victim
obviously has not consented to be injured. A tort victim who has obtained a judgment
against his tortfeasor has thus become an unwilling creditor. For a discussion of various
aspects of nonconsensual credit transactions, see Note, supra note 11, at 840-44; Note, Should
Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts of Their Corporations?, 76 YALE L.J. 1190
(1967).
16. Policy conflicts involving credit transactions will be analyzed further in the discussion of inadequate capitalization. See text accompanying notes 128-34 infra.
17. Application of the doctrine of disregard of the corporate fiction in taxation cases
has special importance in Florida because of the extensive utilization of limited partnership
in land transactions. The general partner in these limited partnerships is often a corporation
formed by the limited partners. The Internal Revenue Service has begun to apply the
doctrine to this type of situation. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 Cura. BuLL. 735.
18. Jurisdiction emphasizes the corporate relationships considered under the instrumentality and alter ego theories. See note 26 infra. In a manner similar to the corporate
fiction, jurisdiction involves legal fictions and thus to some extent must emphasize form
over substance. Instances in which such emphasis is evident arise most often in cases
involving parent-subsidiary relationships. See, e.g., Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
267 U.S. 333 (1925); Berkman v. Ann Lewis Shops, 246 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1957) (applying
Florida law). The mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship does not validate
service upon the subsidiary in order to reach the parent, nor does the fact that the parent
owns all the stock of the subsidiary establish that the parent is doing business within the
meaning of the Florida jurisdictional statute. FLA. STAT. §48.081 (1973). See, e.g., Turner v.
Jack Tar Grand Bahamas, Ltd., 353 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1965); Hermetic Seal Corp. v. Savo)
Electronics, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2410 (S.D. Fla. 1967) (applying Florida law). Even additional
factors such as the identity of officers and directors of the parent and subsidiary corporations
or the residence of the officers and directors of both the parent and subsidiary do not
supply the necessary minimum contact. See Hermetic Seal Corp. v. Savoy Electronics, Inc..
290 F. Supp. 240, 243 (S.D. Fla. 1967) (applying Florida law). The corporate fiction will be
disregarded and the courts will look to the real party in interest, however, if the subsidiary
is a mere jobber or distributor through which the parent sells its products in the state. Id.
Similarly, if a principal officer of the parent corporation maintains an office in the state
from which he controls the subsidiary, and many of the company affairs are handled in
the state, the subsidiary will be considered the alter ego or instrumentality of the parent
and the state will have jurisdiction. Id.
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volves questions of judicial intent.19 Such situations, although involving
difficult constitutional problems, seldom present disputes unique to corporate
limited liability and the doctrine of dislaw such as does conflict between
20
regard of the corporate fiction.
MYSTICAL METAPHORS

Analysis of the legal theories involved in the doctrine of disregard is
complicated by the general nomenclature of the theories themselves as well
21
as the judicial tendency to cite several theories in support of a single result.
The major legal devices used to apply the doctrine are: the instrumentality
rule, the agency rule, the enterprise entity rule, the identity rule, and the alter
ego rule. The basis of each of these rules is summarized in this section. It
should be emphasized, however, that it is not as important to understand
completely the intricacies of these various rules as it is to comprehend the
basic nature of the doctrine itself and to recognize the conflicting policies
that must be balanced to reach equitable results in divergent fact situations.
The Instrumentality Rule
The instrumentality "rule" is not an actual rule; rather, it is "a convenient way of designating the application, in particular circumstances, of the
broader equitable principles that the doctrine of corporate entity, recognized
generally and for most purposes, will not be regarded when so to do would
work fraud or injustice." 22 Thus, when a shareholder is held liable for the acts
of the corporation, a judicial statement that the corporation is the instrumentality of the shareholder is conclusory23and- does not aid in the search for the
substantive rationale of the decision.
The instrumentality rule is generally divided into separate elements that
24
combine to trigger its application. The first element is abuse of corporate
19. Since these cases deal with legislative intent and due process and do not involve
the legal roadblock of limited liability, courts are more likely to concentrate on reaching
an equitable result. Justice Douglas emphasized this idea in Anderson v. Abbot, 321 U.S.
349 (1944). While discussing an attempt to create a corporation for the purpose of avoiding
statutory restrictions, he stated: "[T]he courts will not permit themselves to be blinded or
deceived by mere forms of law but will deal with the substance of the transaction involved
as if the corporate agency did not exist and as the justice of the case may require." Id. at
363. Florida courts have adopted this position and have concentrated on determining whether
statutes have been circumvented rather than merely examining corporate relationships. See
Aztec Motel, Inc. v. State ex rel. Faircloth, 251 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1971).
20. See generally Note, supra note 7.
21. See, e.g., House of Koscot Dev. Corp. v. American Line Cosmetics, Inc., 468 F.2d
64 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying Florida law); Markow v. Alcock, 356 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1966)
(applying Florida law).
22. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939).

23. E.

LATrY, SUBSIDARIES AND ArnuATE

CORPORATIONs

3 (1936).

24. See generally Automotriz del Golfo de California v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 306
P.2d 1 (1957); Shafford v. Otto Sales Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d 428, 308 P.2d 428, (Dist. Ct.
App. 1957); Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967); Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry.,
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organization resulting in shareholder domination of policies, finances, and
business practices to such an extent that the corporation has no separate will
of its own.2 5 Control of management alone, however, is insufficient to justify
invocation of the instrumentality rule. 26 Actual shareholder domination of
corporate affairs must be so pervasive that the shareholder and the corporation
are no longer separate entities.27 In such circumstances, the corporation is
merely an adjunct or instrumentality of the shareholder.
In one sense, all corporations are instrumentalities of their stockholders
because the decision to incorporate is motivated by a desire to advance
stockholders' interests. This fact, along with the difficulty of accurately defining the impermissible degree of control, indicates that evaluation of control
factors alone will not clearly define the point at which the corporate fiction
will be disregarded. In fact, courts have added to this confusion by emphasizing
the overt factors that demonstrate abnormal shareholder control, while
failing to enunciate the underlying legal policies that justify disregard of the
28
corporate fiction.
The second element of the instrumentality rule involves shareholder use
of corporate power to commit fraud or violate a plaintiff's legal rights. 29 This
aspect of the instrumentality rule emphasizes the nature of the wrong resulting from a misuse of the corporate entity. The resultant inequity must
stand out in such a way that arguments favoring its correction through application of the doctrine of disregard overcome the policy considerations sup30
porting the existence of the corporate fiction.
244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926); W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS 41, 42 (perm.
ed. rev. 1963); F. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATION chs. 3, 5, 6, 14 (1931);
Comment, Disregard of Corporate Entity -Liability of Stockholders for Contractual Obligations of the Corporation, 42 CONN. B.J. 127 (1968); Comment, Alternative Methods of
Piercing the Corporate Veil in Contract and Tort Cases, 48 B.U.L. REv. 123 (1968).
25. See, e.g., Automotriz del Golfo de California v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 793, 306 P.2d
1 (1957); Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967).
26. See Markow v. Alcock, 356 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1966) (applying Florida law); Advertects
v. Sawyer Indus., 84 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1955).
27. Powell has listed the following as factors to be considered in determining degree
of control: (1) ownership of all or most of the corporations' stock; (2) common directors
or officers; (3) parent financing of the subsidiary; (4) inadequate capitalizatin of the corporation; (5) payment of corporate expenses by the shareholder; (6) commercial dependence;
(7) treatment of the corporation as a department of the defendant; (8) directors and
officers of the corporation taking orders from the defendant; (9) irregularities in observing
corporate formalities. F. POWELL, supra note 24, ch. 6. No single factor is sufficient to indicate the necessary control. Rather, it is a combination of these factors, viewed in light
of the particular facts of each case, that creates the requisite control. In addition, there
are factors that act as obstacles to application of the doctrine. For example, a difference
in corporate powers, such as the held corporation's having power to do that which is
beyond the power of the holding corporation, is an obstacle to complete disregard of the
former entity. See Corsicana Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68 (1919); Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960).
28. See generally Gillespie, The Thin Corporate Line: Loss of Limited Liability
Protection, 45 N.D.L. REv. 363 (1968).
29. See authorities cited note 24 supra.
30. It is the second element that gives substance to the remedy. Without this element
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The third element of the instrumentality rule, often implicit in the
second, looks to the causal relationship between proscribed corporate control
and a breach of legal duty resulting in provable injury or loss to a plaintiff.
This third element emphasizes the fact that abnormal shareholder control
does not by itself justify disregard of the corporate fiction through the instrumentality rule.
Florida courts have never explicitly defined the elements making up the
instrumentality rule. Observance of the elements is shown, however, by the
fact that circumstances indicative of abnormal dominance and control have
resulted in application of the rule3 in situations where fraud has produced
inequities justifying disregard of the corporate fiction. 32 The purpose of the
doctrine demands that fraud alone activate its application,3 3 and the concept
of a separate corporate entity may not be used to insulate crime or justify
wrong.34 Thus, if the controlling shareholder uses the corporation to perpetrate fraud on a third party, the corporate entity should be disregarded even
if corporate formalities have been observed.35
In this regard, a Connecticut jurist has proposed a fraudulent purpose
test to replace the instrumentality rule.36 This test imposes liability on a
shareholder for abuse of a corporate entity, thereby placing primary emphasis
on the use of corporate control to violate the legal rights of other parties.3 7
Under the fraudulent purpose test, use of the corporation in an unacceptable
manner replaces the first element of the instrumentality rule. Thus, the
presence of variables tending to show abnormal dominance is strongly indicative of the shareholder's abusive control of the corporation, but the variables
are not essential to prove such control.3 8 Because the fraudulent purpose test
stresses the actual wrong rather than the variables, which are symptomatic
or indicative of wrong, it is preferable to the instrumentality rule.39
a court would be emphasizing form only. Courts still improperly stress form in both the
alter ego and instrumentality theories, however. See text accompanying notes 60-78 infra.
31. E.g., Markow v. Alcock, 356 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1966) (applying Florida law); Codomo
v. Emanuel, 91 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1956); Advertects, Inc. v. Sawyer Indus., 84 So. 2d 21 (Fla.

1955).
32. E.g., Aztec Motel, Inc. v. State ex rel. Faircloth, 251 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1971); Riley
v. Fatt, 47 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1950); Tiernan v. Sheldon, 191 So. 2d 87 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
33. "In cases of fraud, whether actual or constructive, the courts regard the real parties
responsible, granting relief against them or denying their claims and defenses because of
it; and this is especially true in equity. It is a principle older than the modem law of
private business corporations, and does not depend on the regard or disregard of the
corporation." I W. FzcrcHE, supra note 24, §44, at 225.
34. FDIC v. Franchise Fin. & Management Co., 354 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D. Fla. 1973);
Aztec Motel, Inc. v. State ex rel. Faircioth, 251 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1971); Tiernan v. Sheldon,
191 So. 2d 87 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
35. See generally Comment, Liability of Parent for Debts of Subsidiary, 10 Sw. L.J.
77 (1956).
36. Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 580, 227 A.2d 552, 561 (1967) (Cotter, J., dissenting).
37. See Comment, Disregard of Corporate Entity -Liability of Stockholders for Contractual Obligations of Corporation, 42 CONN. B.J. 127 (1968).
38. Id.
39. See text accompanying notes 60-78 infra.
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The Identity Rule and the Alter Ego
The identity rule applies when the actions of an individual stockholder
are such that they tend to mislead an innocent party into believing he is
40
dealing with the individual rather than with the corporation. If the individual stockholder has created this impression by failing to clarify the
capacity in which he is acting, the separate entity fiction will be ignored and
thus the corporation and the individual stockholder will be considered as
one.

41

A corporation may cease to exist in several ways. The most common
method is compliance with the state statutory scheme for dissolving corporations, 42 but the corporation will also be considered nonexistent when its
formal structure has so completely deteriorated that it exists in name only.
There exists a gray area, moreover, where deterioration is not complete, but
the interrelation of individual and corporate activities is so great that a
unity is created from the commingled entities.4 3 Courts following this rationale often emphasize the misleading nature of the acts44 rather than the fraud
45

emphasized under the instrumentality rule.
The alter ego theory may be described as a cross between the instrumentality and identity rules. This theory disregards the corporate fiction when the
separate personalities of the individual stockholder and the corporation have
ceased to exist, and therefore continued recognition of the corporate fiction
would lead to inequitable results.4 6 This concept of unity of personalities is
similar to the identity rule.47 To show the existence of the necessary degree
of unity, however, there must be a merger of interest and ownership in excess
of that evident in a normal corporation-shareholder relationship. The unity
of interest and ownership required to bring into play the alter ego theory
is indicated by the same factors that show abnormal control and dominance
under the instrumentality rule. 4 1 This similarity indicates the difficulties en-

40. For example, because a corporation can act only through its agents, if a controlling
stockholder is also an agent of the corporation, confusion can exist regarding the capacity
in which that stockholder acts. See Comment, supra note 37, at 132. Although this article
refers to the agency theory, Florida considers the identity and agency theories to be interchangeable. See text accompanying notes 52-56 infra.
41. Id.

42.

FLA. STAT.

§ § 608.041, .77 (1973).

43. See Note, supra note 7, at 463-65. This note mentions that the concept of creating
a unity of theretofore separate entities is of doubtful validity in contract cases where

the distinction was the original purpose of incorporation. Id. at 464.
44. See Autonmotriz del Golfo de California v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 306 P.2d 1 (1957);
Shafford v. Otto Sales Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d 428, 308 P.2d 429 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
45.

See text accompanying notes 23-39 supra.

46. E.g., Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 202 P. 673 (1921); Associated Vendors, Inc.
v. Oakland Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 825, 26 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). The
latter case emphasized that actual fraud is not required but that the underlying inequity

must be more than the dissatisfaction of a creditor.
47. See text accompanying notes 40 supra and 60 infra.
48.

See note 28 supra.
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countered in determining which theory is being employed by a particular
49

court.

The Agency Rule
"Agency" is a term used to describe various legal theories.50 Courts often
use the term in the technical sense, referring to the principal-agent relationship.51 Agency, however, is also employed as a synonym for the instrumentality rule. Florida has adopted both approaches, 52 and has in addition used
agency as an alternative means of describing the identity theory.5 3 This interchangeable use of the term indicates the courts' confusion and supports the
conclusion that comprehension of the general nature of the doctrine of disregard and recognition of the conflicting policies that are necessarily
balanced in deciding whether to employ the doctrine in a particular instance
are more important than memorization of technical distinctions among the
various legal theories used to justify employment of the doctrine.
The Enterprise Entity Rule
The enterprise entity rule concerns itself with organizational fragmentation of a particular economic enterprise; specifically, it encompasses multiple
close corporations engaged in identical or similar businesses under common
ownership or control, and it also applies to parent-subsidiary relationships.-s
The rule does not operate to thrust personal liability on principal shareholders. Rather, it is used to look through organizational form to economic
49. Many authorities use the instrumentality and alter ego theories interchangeably.
See 1 W. FL Tc.R, supra note 24, §41.1. Considering a corporation a mere department in
one case and identified with the shareholder in another seems an insignificant distinction.
Although it may be said that the requirement of fraud applies to the instrumentality
theory while the alter ego theory emphasizes the misleading nature of the defendant's
acts, Florida courts have avoided this distinction by requiring that the corporation be
shown to have misled creditors or perpetrated fraud upon them. See, e.g., Advertects v.
Sawyer Indus., 84 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1955); Delta Air Lines v. Wilson, 210 So. 2d 761 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1968).
50. See generally F. PowELL, supra note 24, at 23.
51. Although normally the relationship between stockholder and corporation is not
considered to be that of principal and agent, Moline Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U.S.
436 (1943), a corporation and a shareholder or parent corporation clearly may form a
technical agency relationship as both are separate legal entities. This relationship will
not occur often, however, because one of the primary reasons for incorporation is the
limitation of liability for the principal. If a technical agency relationship does exist, the
principal may be held liable without fraud or wrongdoing on his part. Such a result
follows from the nature of the law of agency and does not result from a disregard of the
corporation as an independent entity. See Note, supra note 7, at 462-63.
52. Markow v. Alcock, 356 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1966) ("agency" a synonym for "instrumentality'); Thomkin Corp. v. Miller, 156 Fla. 388, 24 So. 2d 48 (1945) ("agency" used
in the technical sense).
53. House of Koscot Dev. Corp. v. American Line Cosmetics, Inc., 468 F.2d 64 (5th
Cir. 1972) (applying Florida law). For a discussion of the identity rule see text accompanying
notes 40-45 supra.
54. See generally Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUAT. L. Rr v. 343 (1947).
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55
reality in an endeavor to impose liability on an entire economic unit. In
the case of related corporations the entire economic family benefits from
the successful efforts of one of its members, consequently equitable considerations often demand that the whole enterprise be held responsible for
the debts of each individual corporate member. "6 The equities demanding
this result are particularly acute in nonconsensual credit transactions. 57 When
the corporate veil between brother-sister corporations is pierced under the
entity theory, the shareholder is not denied the right to limited liability but
5
only the benefit of dual protection or double limited liability. When the
corporate veil between a parent corporation and its subsidiary is pierced, the
parent corporation is denied limited liability, but its stockholders are denied
only one of the twin protections the parent-subsidiary organization was designed to provide.
The entity theory has not yet met with judicial approval in Florida, but
it has been recognized in several other jurisdictions. 59 It should be noted that
the unity of interest and ownership necessary for application of the entity
theory may also justify utilization of the identity and instrumentality rules.60

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. The systematic fragmentation of an enterprise to minimize risk of loss may lead to
the greatest abuse of the corporate privilege. See generally Gillespie, supra note 28, at
384-87. The famous taxicab cases involve the common practice in the taxicab industry of
vesting ownership of a taxi fleet in many corporations, with each corporation owning only
one or two cabs. Although the fleet operates as a unit in regard to financing, supplies, repairs, and garaging each individual corporation is organized with only the minimum required capital in order to avoid full liability for acts arising as a result of the operation
of a taxi fleet. Thus, any tort victim seriously injured by a particular cab has little hope
of being completely compensated for his injuries. See Walkovsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414,
223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966). But see Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
Although it seems inequitable that a large business can utilize a fragmented organizational structure to shift risk of loss to a tort victim less able to bear that risk, inequities
also develop in schemes designed to correct the situation. While high minimum capital
requirements could be imposed for all corporations regardless of size, such requirements
would unduly restrict small businesses. It would be unfair and unwise to prohibit a small,
one-man operation from competing in legitimate corporate form by requiring as a condition
precedent to corporate status the contribution of an amount of capital that only a large
business could afford.
58. The opposite argument is that as far as limited liability is concerned there
should be no distinction between individual and corporate entities because each is equally
likely to provide risk capital in needed enterprise.
59. See In re Pittsburgh Ry., 155 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1946); Hartford Steam Serv. Co. v.
Sullivan, 26 Conn. 277, 220 A.2d 772 (1966); Hall v. John S. Isaacs & Sons Farm, 37 Del.
Ch. 530, 146 A.2d 602 (Ch. 1958).
60. Under the identity and instrumentality theories, liability is imposed on the shareholder in his personal capacity. Under the enterprise entity rule, the corporate fiction is
disregarded in relation to the individual corporations themselves, and they are regarded
as a single corporation. Thus, under this latter rule personal liability is not imposed
on the shareholder when the veil between brother and sister corporations is pierced.
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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROL AND UNITY FACTORS

Legal theories that rely on a number of interacting variables to show extraordinary unity of interest and ownership or an unusual amount of dominance
and control are of questionable utility when applied to credit transactions involving the dose corporation. The Florida Legislature has followed the
modern trend of distinguishing between closely held and public corporations. 61 The judiciary should similarly tailor application of the doctrine of
disregard to the structural contours of the particular organization in question. 62 Specifically, judicial modifications in the employment of the doctrine
with respect to dose corporations are essential to give meaningful effect to
the special legislative provisions concerning such organizations.
The instrumentality rule, for example, necessitates consideration of interacting variables to determine whether corporate control exceeds permissible
limits.63 The Florida Close Corporation Statutes simplify or eliminate corporate

formalities and sanction internal control methods similar to those used in
partnerships. By allowing corporations to operate as informal partnerships 4
with a single shareholders and no directors, 66 the legislature has approved far
more corporate control and informality than that allowed under traditional
corporation law.67 It is unrealistic to require the close corporation to have a
mind or existence distinct from that of its controlling shareholders., Judicial
insistence on applying standards emphasizing abnormal restrictions on shareholders' actions to dose corporations is an unjustifiable interference with the
legislative scheme.
Judicial deemphasis of the control and unity of interest standards would
not necessarily permit a dose corporation to operate in a manner that misleads, defrauds, or violates reasonable expectations of third parties. Although
61. FLA. STAT. §§608.01-.77 (1973) are the Florida corporate statutes. FLA. STAT.
§§608.70-.77 (1973) deal exclusively with close corporations. FLA. STAT. §608.70(2) (1973) defines a close corporation as "a corporation for profit whose shares of stock are not generally
traded in the markets maintained by security dealers or brokers."
62. "Perhaps the chief difference between the publicly held and close corporation is
that in the former there is a separation between ownership and control which in itself
requires some statutory regulation. In the close corporation, ownership and control are
identical, or it is the desire of the membership that they should be. The close corporation
is in reality a partnership with the added benefit of limited liability, and it is managed
and conducted informally as a partnership, and usually, harmlessly so from any standpoint of public policy or interest." Stevens, Close Corporationsand the New York Business
Corporation Law of 1961, 11 BUFFALO L. REv. 481-82 (1962).
63. For examples of the variables that courts consider, see note 27 supra.
64. F .A. STAT. §608.75(3) (1973).
65. FLA. STAT. §608.71 (1973).
66. FLA. STAT. §608.72 (1973).
67. Compare the corporate norm contemplated in FLA. STAT. §§608.01-.67 (1973), with
that contemplated under the close corporation statutes, Fr.A STAT. §§608.70-.77 (1971).
68. "Close corporations, although individual entities from a legal standpoint, are
normally no more than vehicles for the goals and motives of their principals. The law is
not necessarily advanced by adopting a rule which includes a presumption that this kind
of corporation may have a 'separate mind, will or existence of its own.' " Zaist v. Olson, 154
Conn. 563, 582-83, 227 A.2d 552, 561 (1968) (Cotter, J., dissenting).
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the lack of formality and supervision inherent in the close corporation69 has
been criticized as creating "excessive maneuverability that may adversely
affect the rights of innocent parties,' ' 70 most small businesses operating under
the close corporation act can be expected to operate in an acceptable manner
because tax laws and economic realities demand it.-' Furthermore, because
management and ownership of a close corporation are usually identical, the
ordinary management liability-2 thrust upon most close corporation stock-

holders serves as an additional protection against excessive maneuverability.73
Finally, the doctrine of disregard of the corporate fiction offers reasonable
protection if the corporate entity has been used to defraud or mislead
creditors.74 Regardless of the specific standards adopted to determine application of the doctrine, general emphasis will be placed on the requirements that the corporation be run in a business-like manner and that the
separate identity of the corporate assets be preserved.75 These requirements
remain not because their violation is wrong per se, but because they are
symptomatic of conditions that mislead or cause other legal wrongs.
The doctrine of disregard should be used as a judicial remedy for actual
wrongs to innocent parties rather than as punishment for mere shareholder
nonadherence to corporate formalities. If the plaintiff has dealt with the
corporation as a corporation he should be estopped from denying its corporate
existence." To allow a plaintiff to recover when he has not been misled or
wronged is to give him an indefensible windfall. Automatic application of
individual shareholder liability based solely on his informal exercise of
absolute corporate control is a triumph of form over substance.-7 Legal
fictions focus on form only to accomplish certain specific purposes. Such fictions should not be employed unless their application will achieve the intended purpose. Imposition of individual shareholder liability based on failure
to adhere to technical corporate formalities, when such failure does not
cause any identifiable injury, flies in the face of the strong policies supporting
69. For a discussion of the nature of the Florida close corporation see Note, Statutory
Recognition of the Close Corporation in Florida, 16 U. FLA. L. REV. 569 (1964).
70. Tennery, The Potential of the Close Corporation: A Question of Economic Validity,
14 How. L.J. 241, 253 (1968).
71. For an analysis of the necessity for adherence to acceptable business standards,
see Cataldo, supra note 11.
72. See generally H. HENN, supra note 4, §§230-42, for a discussion of management
liability.

73. See generally Gillespie, supra note 28, at 376-77.
74. Id.
75. See Tennery, supra note 70.

76. See generally H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONs 31 (rev. ed. 1946); H. HENN, supra
note 4, §141; Comment, Estoppel To Deny Corporate Existence, 31 TENN. L. REV. 336 (1964).
77. Judge Learned Hand considered the important factors to be: "[R]ather in the
form than in the substance of the control: in whether it is exercised immediately, or by
means of a board of directors and officers, left to their own initiative and responsibility in
respect of each transaction as it arises." Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp.
Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929). He was not, however, considering a situation involving
the informality of management and type of control presently allowed in a closely held
corporation.
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the corporate fiction. Failure to distinguish conduct violative of normal
corporate structures from conduct harmful to creditors can result in the
confusion of lawful business organizations with schemes that mislead or defraud.7s
DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FITION IN CREDIT TRANSACTIONS:

THE FLORIDA POSITION
As previously indicated, Florida courts have not distinguished between
public and close corporations in applying the doctrine of disregard of the
corporate fiction. They have, however, required more than just complete
control79 The precise extent and nature of the additional requirements are
the cause of much confusion.
In South Florida Citrus Land Co. v. Waldin ° the Florida supreme court
attempted to dispel some of the confusion by articulating a general, but restrictive, description of the doctrine:
The rule or fiction of law that a corporation is a separate entity ...
does not always obtain in a court of equity where to do so would result in enabling the shareholders of a private corporation who substantially own and control a corporation and its officers who are those
identical shareholders to perpetrate frauds on those who deal with
them."'
Subsequently, in Biscayne Realty & Insurance Co. v. Ostend Realty Co.8 2 the
court held that a corporate entity may not be used to mislead creditors,
perpetrate frauds, or commit other illegal acts.8 3 The court thus emphasized
the use of the corporation and the result of that use rather than the mere
abuse of corporate formalities. This functional approach is illustrated by
the fact that observance of corporate formalities cannot insulate fraudulent
acts. As the Biscayne Realty court observed: "[T]he absence of the formal
evidence of the character of the act cannot preclude judicial inquiry on the
subject. If it were otherwise, then in one department of the law fraud would
8 4
enjoy immunity awarded to it in no other."
78. Proponents of the idea that disregard of corporate formalities alone renders the
stockholder liable base their arguments on the doctrine of estoppel. Estoppel applies because by disregarding the formalities the shareholder indicates that he does not consider
the corporation to be a separate entity, and he should therefore be estopped from asserting
separate entity as a defense. In addition, the grant of limited liability is a privilege, and if
the shareholder himself violates the conditions upon which that privilege depends he
should not be heard to complain. This second rationale is strongest in tort situations where
the corporation cannot rely on arguments of assumption of the risk and estoppel. See notes
14-15 supra.
79. See, e.g., Russell v. Gans, 275 So. 2d 270 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1973); Delta Air Lines
v. Wilson, 210 So. 2d 761 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
80. 61 Fla. 766, 55 So. 862 (1911).
81. Id. at 772, 55 So. at 864.
82. 109 Fla. 1, 148 So. 560 (1933).
83. Id. at 5, 148 So. at 564.
84. 109 Fla. 1, 5, 148 So. 560, 564 (1933), quoting from State ex rel. Watson v. Standard
Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N.E. 279 (1892).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1974

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 9
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXV1I

In the 1950 decision of Riley v. Fatts5 the Florida supreme court again
stressed use of the corporation rather than mere abuse of corporate formalities.
In Riley the defendant was the sole stockholder of Riley Builders, Inc. Substantial evidence indicated that the corporation had failed to keep any
records at all and that checks payable to Riley Builders were often deposited
in the defendant's personal bank account.8 6 Despite this disregard for
corporate formalities, the court found the facts insufficient to justify disregard of the corporate entity.8 7 The Riley court was unwilling to pierce
the corporate veil unless the corporation "was organized or used to mislead
creditors or to perpetrate a fraud upon them."' 8 The plaintiff in Riley was
not misled because he knew he was dealing with a corporation. Thus, due
to the "absence of pleading and proof that the corporation was organized
for an illegal purpose or that its members fraudulently used the corporation,"
the court refused to disregard the corporate fiction.
Increased judicial contact with the doctrine of disregard added to confusion
regarding the factors that determine its applicability. This confusion was aggravated by ambiguous decisional language as well as an inability to ascertain
whether the courts' omission of certain factors in describing situations ripe
for application of the doctrine was intentional or whether the omitted factors
were merely not applicable to those particular situations. For example, the
9
held that an order directing sharecourt in Advertects v. Sawyer Industries"
not be held personally liable for
show
cause
why
they
should
holders to
corporate debts would not. be issued unless there had been a preliminary
showing that:
[T]he corporation is in actuality the alter ego of the stockholder and
that it was organized or after organization was employed by the stockholder for fraudulent or misleading purposes or in some fashion the
corporate property was converted or the corporate assets depleted for
the personal benefit of the individual stockholders or that the corporate
structure was not bona fidely established or, in general, that property
belonging to the corporation can be traced into the hands of the
stockholders. °
This statement indicates that more than a mere alter ego relationship is required to hold the shareholders personally liable; a showing of fraudulent
or misleading purpose on the part of the defendant shareholders is a necessary
element of the plaintiff's proof.0 1
The Advertects facts involved the mishandling of corporate assets rather
than the abuse of control or management formalities. The mishandling of
corporate assets is itself only an indication of abnormal control or unity and
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

47 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1950).
Id. at 771.
Id. at 773.
Id.
84 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1955).
Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
This is consistent with prior law. See Riley v. Fatt, 47 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1950).
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not proof of the existence of a substantive wrong.92 Yet, because this type of
corporate abuse is often detrimental to a creditor and also presents difficult
problems of proof for the plaintiff,93 it is logical for courts to consider it a
substantive wrong justifying application of the doctrine when combined with
an existing alter ego relationship. 94
It is not dear, however, that the Advertects court adopted this rationale.
The quoted statement concerned the imposition of personal liability, but the
theory could be either the doctrine of disregard or the constructive trust
theory9 5 under which a defendant found guilty of misappropriating corporate
assets may be held personally liable for the amount misappropriated. 96 The
Advertects court's failure to identify the theory upon which it imposed per97
sonal liability thus contributed to the widespread confusion in this area.
A more recent case, Russell v. Gans,9s indicates that confusion concerning
the legal theories underlying imposed shareholder liability still exists. The
court in Russell quoted Delta Air Lines v. Wilson-9 for the proposition that
the corporate veil may not be pierced without a showing that creditorsg0 0
have been misled or that fraud has been perpetrated. But the court also
stated that before it would issue an order to show cause why personal liability
should not be imposed, it would require a showing of fraud or a showing
that corporate funds had been misappropriated for personal use. 01 Thus,
the Russell opinion did not include intermingling of assets in a list of factors
justifying application of the doctrine of disregard,102 but implied that intermingling alone would justify imposition of personal liability. Russell, like
Advertects, failed to mention the constructive trust theory or any specific
limitation on total personal liability that would exist under such theory. Thus,
92. See generally Markow v. Alcock, 356 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1966) (applying Florida
law); F. POWELL, supra note 24.
93. Shareholder manipulation of corporate assets is likely to be detrimental to the
creditor as it is these assets that the creditor normally tries to attack. If assets have been
removed from the corporation, the creditor will be required to prove that the removal was
improper. This could present difficult proof problems, especially if the corporation has
failed to keep adequate records.
94. Although it is reasonable for the courts to consider this type of corporate abuse
to be the substantive wrong, the doctrine of disregard of the corporate fiction should not
be applied unless the abuse is the cause of the injury to the plaintiff. See text following
note 29 supra.
95. "A constructive trust is one raised by equity in respect of property which has been
acquired by fraud or where though acquired originally without fraud it is against equity
that it should be retained by him who holds it." Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 809, 113 So.
419, 422 (1927).
96. See Smith v. Smith, 108 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1959); Spicer v. Erpenback, 112 Fla. 285,
150 So. 585 (1933); Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927).
97. In addition, because of the courts' use of the disjunctive "or" it is arguable that
the courts consider this category of corporate abuse sufficient in itself to justify application
of the doctrine of disregard or the estoppel theory.
98. 275 So. 2d 270 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
99. 210 So. 2d 761 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
100. 275 So. 2d at 271.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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while stockholder abuses of the corporate entity involving mishandling of
corporate assets occupy a special position with regard to the imposition of
personal liability on individual shareholders, the exact significance of this
factor is as yet unclear.

1 3
0

Florida case law also indicates confusion regarding other aspects of the
doctrine. For example, in Tiernan v. Sheldon1o4 the court stated:
[C]ourts will look through the screen of corporate entity to the individuals who compose it in cases in which the corporation . . . is a

mere instrumentality or agent of another corporation or individual
owning all or most of its stock, or where the purpose is to evade some
statute or to accomplish some fraud or illegal purpose or where the
corporation was employed by the stockholders for fraudulent or misleading purposes, was organized or used to mislead creditors or to
perpetrate a fraud upon them or to evade existing personal liability.10o
This language suggests that the existence of a corporation as a mere instrumentality is sufficient to justify application of the doctrine of disregard. Because of the strong policies favoring limited liability, the estoppel and assumption of risk aspect of consensual credit transactions,106 and the inequities

involved in imposing liability upon an individual for actions not resulting in
identifiable injuries, this would be a highly undesirable result.1° 7
As a practical matter, courts interpreting prior case law have in the past
placed greater reliance on a specific enumeration of factors that, when
combined, mandate application of the doctrine, rather than on the general
statements suggesting that mere proof of excessive control is sufficient.10s In
103. See note 94 supra.
104. 191 So. 2d 87 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
105. Id. at 89 (emphasis added).
106. See note 14 supra.
107. See text accompanying notes 10-16 supra.
108. This statement may not be universally true given the degree of inconsistency
present in the Florida courts' interpretation of the doctrine. House of Koscot Dev. Corp.
v. American Line Cosmetics, Inc., 468 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1972), illustrates this problem.
Koscot involved a plaintiff, Development, and three defendants. The first defendant,
American Line, was controlled by Koscot, which was in turn controlled by defendant, Turner. Plaintiff, in an attempt to hold both Turner and Koscot liable for the act of American
Line, alleged first that American Line was the alter ego of Turner and Koscot, and second
that Turner and Koscot tortiously interfered with and induced the breach of Development's
contract with American Line. Although the body of the opinion employed the terms "alter
ego, agency," and "identity," a footnote stated: "In light of our holding that Turner
could be held liable under the conduit or instrumentality theory [there was evidence of
abuse of corporate formalities involving both the management and control and the mishandling of assets], we do not need to decide whether the evidence was also sufficient to
establish that American Line Cosmetics was operated as a fraud upon its creditors." Id.
at 66 n.l. This language could mean either that the court considered abuses of the
corporate formalities sufficient justification for disregarding the corporate fiction, or that
the court recognized that the instrumentality theory can be used not only when fraud
is present but also when the corporation is used to perpetrate other illegal acts. The latter
interpretation is supported by Biscayne Realty & Ins. Co. v. Ostend Realty Co., 109 Fla. 1,
148 So. 560 (1933). Of the three cases the Koscot court cited to support its proposition, two
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the wake of the recent case of Levinstein v. Sapirolo9 however, this may no
longer be true. Levinstein involved a one-man corporation having as its sole
asset a tract of land. The contract under which the corporation sold this
realty to the assignor of the plaintiff contained a guarantee that adequate
sewage facilities would be available. Because the sale totally depleted its
assets, the corporation was dissolved. Subsequently, the local pollution control officer imposed a stop order, which prevented the extension of water or
sewage disposal service to the land. Plaintiff sued defendant, the sole shareholder of the dissolved corporation, alleging that he had personally
guaranteed the contract and that the corporation had been his alter ego. 110
The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff. Reversing, the district
court of appeal stated that the record showed no evidence supporting the
conclusion that defendant had abused the corporate entity.""' Additionally,
the district court found no evidence of use of the corporation by the defendant to perpetrate a fraud."12 The Florida supreme court quashed the
district court's opinion and held that fraudulent use of the corporation was
3
not the only factor sufficient to curtail a shareholder's limited liability."1
The supreme court stated:
We do not believe the rule of limited individual liability is this restrictive. There may be cases such as this one where the nature of
the relationship between the individual and his alter ego, his corporation, and their activity is so completely personalized that the ingredient of actual fraud is unnecessary in order for the individual
to be held liable . . . 4
Because the alter ego theory requires fraud or the misleading of the
creditor by the defendant's abuse of corporate formalities, the Florida supreme court did not make new law by holding that actual fraud is not always
required." 5 The facts of Levinstein indicate that the defendant was innocent
of actual fraud. 116 In addition, the evidence was apparently insufficient to
establish that plaintiff's assignor was misled into believing he was dealing
with an individual rather than a corporation. Normally, when a party contracts with a corporation it is assumed the parties contemplate that the
corporation alone will be liable for warranties contained in the contract.
This expectation invokes the doctrines of estoppel and assumption of the
invoked similar problems of interpretation while only one, Riley v. Fatt, 47 So. 2d 769 (Fla.
1950), clearly indicated that abuse of corporate formalities is by itself insufficient to justify
application of the doctrine.
109. 279 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1973).
110. Id. at 859.
111. 266 So. 2d 40 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
112. Id. at 43.
113. 279 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1973).
114. Id. at 860.
115. See text accompanying notes 40-46 supra.
116. Levinstein did not involve actual fraud because the defendant could not be
charged with knowledge of the breach of warranty resulting from the superseding inter-

vention of the ordinance.
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risk against a potential party plaintiff. 1 17 The agreement in the Levinstein
case was improvident on the part of the plaintiff, but as the court stated
in Tiernan: "Courts can and will set aside fraudulent schemes perpetrated
upon innocent parties, but it is not a proper judicial function to relieve
18
one from the consequences of a bad bargain.""
In this context, the doctrine of constructive fraud" 9 might distinguish
Levinstein from a mere bad bargain situation, thereby precluding the defenses of estoppel and assumption of the risk.1 2 Constructive fraud does not
require actual knowledge or intent to defraud; it encompasses breaches of
equitable duties that, contrary to good conscience, operate as virtual frauds
to the injury of others."2 Due to the immediate dissolution of the corporate
vendor, the plaintiff vendee in Levinstein would have had no one to provide
compensation for his injuries unless the corporate fiction was disregarded. In
such cases it would be meaningless for the parties to include warranties in
their contract if immediately after execution of the contract the corporate
party could dissolve and thereby avoid all potential liability. Should the
corporation continue to exist and operate in good faith, the plaintiff will
have some hope of recovery. Should the corporation dissolve immediately,
however, compensation for breach of warranties will no longer be possible
and the bargain will become impossible rather than improvident. Such a
result certainly could not be within the reasonable contemplation of the
vendee and therefore it constitutes misrepresentation sufficient to support the
doctrine of constructive fraud. If the Levinstein court considered either constructive or actual fraud alone sufficient to activate the doctrine of disregard,
it followed the judicial txend of other jurisdictions.1"2 A problem exists,
though, because the court referred to the "nature of the relationship between
the individual and his alter ego," and activity that was "completely personalized. ' ' 1 23 Previous applications of the doctrine of disregard involved excessive
shareholder control or actual unity between the individual shareholder and
his corporate alter ego. 24 Perhaps the personalized relationship mentioned
in Levinstein refers to situations involving these same factors. If the court
117. See note 14 supra.
118. 191 So. 2d 87, 89 (4th D.G.A. Fla. 1966).
119. "Constructive fraud is simply a term applied to a great variety of transactions
which equity regards as wrongful, [and] to which it attributes the same or similar effects
as those which follow from actual fraud." Douglas v. Ogle, 80 Fla. 42, 45, 85 So. 243, 244
(1920).
120. The idea that application of the doctrine can be justified by general equitable
considerations was first expounded in Fickling Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 123 Fla. 556, 167
So. 42 (1936), where the court discussed applying the doctrine where the corporation was
used as a "convenience for accomplishing an unconscionable transaction." Id. at 558, 167
So. at 43.
121. See note 119 supra.
122. See, e.g., Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823, 830 (5th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960); Woodbury v. Pickering Lumber Co., 10 F. Supp. 761 (W.D.
Mo. 1933), modified, 77 F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1935); Platt v. Billingsley, 234 Cal. App. 2d 577,
44 Cal. Rptr. 476 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
123. 279 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1973) (emphasis added).
124. See text accompanying notes 22-49 supra.
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considered shareholder control or entity unity alone to be sufficient justification for application of the doctrine, it would be an abrupt change from
prior law 2 5 that could lead to undesirable results.. 26 It is to be hoped that
Levinstein does not portend such a direction.
TnE

SPECIAL PROBLEM OF INADEQUATE CAPITALIZATION

The abuses of corporate formalities that activate both the instrumentality
and alter ego theories are usually symptoms of a wrong.127 Inadequate
capitalization, on the other hand, is often viewed as merely indicative of the
corporation's financial dependence on the shareholder. 2 Many jurisdictions
have distinguished this factor from fraud or other injuries sufficient in themselves to support relief. 29 In Florida, inadequate capitalization is simply one
of several factors that courts consider in justifying application of the
doctrine. 30 Even if a corporation is shown to be inadequately capitalized
or to have transferred assets while insolvent, there must also be proof of
fraud in the organization of the corporation or in the transfer of its assets,
not simply proof of a fraudulent result, to support the doctrine's application. 3 1 Such an approach is improper. Inadequate capitalization by itself

should in certain circumstances be enough to trigger the doctrine of disregard."32 Limited liability is a privilege granted to corporate shareholders
to encourage risk capital investment.' 33 There is no quid pro quo for the
privilege where shareholders fail to provide the minimal level of corporate
capitalization. This principle of reciprocity has been stated as follows:

125. See note 113 supra.
126. See text accompanying notes 106-07 supra.
127. For examples of these abuses, see note 25 supra.
128. See, e.g., Markow v. Alcock, 356 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1966) (applying Florida law);
Harris v. Curtis, 8 Cal. App. 3d 837, 87 Cal. Rptr. 614 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
129. E.g., Carlesimo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal. App. 2d 482, 197 P.2d 167 (Dist. Ct. App.
1948); Hanson v. Bradley, 298 Mass. 371, 10 N.E.2d 259 (1937).
130. Markow v. Alcock, 356 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1966) (applying Florida law). For a
discussion of the significance of inadequate capitalization in the alter ego theory, see Note,
Attorney-Director-Officer as Alter Ego of Undercapitalized Corporation, 1962 Dust L.J. 450.
131. Delta Air Lines v. Wilson, 210 So. 2d 761 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
132. California has come closest to considering the element of undercapitalization as
the wrong itself. In Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641
(1961), holding the defendant shareholder personally liable to a tort creditor, Justice
Traynor stated the rule: "The equitable owners of a corporation . . . are personally
liable [1] when they treat the assets of the corporation as their own . . . [2] when they
hold themselves out as being personally liable for debts of the corporation; or [3] when
they provide inadequate capitalization and actively participate in the conduct of corporate
affairs." Id. at 579, 364 P.2d at 475, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 643. Of these three reasons, only the
latter was present in the Minton case. California has apparently retreated from this position, however. In Harris v. Curtis, 8 Cal. App. 3d 837, 87 Cal. Rptr. 614 (Dist. Ct. App.
1970), inadequate capitalization was considered only a factor, by itself insufficient to render
the shareholder personally liable. Although Minton involved a tort creditor, no mention
was made of this distinction. See Note, supra note 11, at 825-30.
133. See note 11 supra,
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The corporation is meant to be a device whereby, among other things,
one may do business with the risk of losing not all of one's possessions
but only that portion thereof which one invests in the business in
question. There is of itself, on the part of those persons who may be
adversely affected by the limited liability privilege, a considerable
forced concession-a compromise in the interests of business and presumably of society. But it is a compromise, a mutual give and take, not
a license to the owners of a business to take all and give nothing. When
the law substitutes a special fund as a source from which creditors are
to be paid, in place of a general fund (i.e., unlimited responsibility),
it presupposes not only that the special fund exists, but it is such a
fund as normally answers the requirements of the business, and that
those who create the fund have not3 the unrestricted power arbitrarily
to fix the fund at practically zero.1 1
Clearly, the problem of inadequate capitalization involves an assessment of
the extent to which shareholders should be allowed to avoid the risks of
doing business.135 This assessment requires an analysis of the distinction
between tort and contract creditors. Granting limited liability to shareholders of inadequately capitalized corporations is most inequitable in the
case of a tort creditor with an unsatisfied judgment. 36 The objectives of
modern tort law are just compensation, deterrence, and, to some extent,
punishment. 37 Limited liability hinders realization of these objectives and
encourages low capitalization in businesses, particularly those that are inherently dangerous. 13 8 Therefore, to promote rather than to hinder the goals
of tort law, shareholders' liability should be contingent upon adequate
capitalization at the corporation's inception. Such an approach would reduce
this inherent conflict between commercial goals and tort law principles.
The compelling inequities that often result from limited shareholder
liability in contests between a tort victim and an undercapitalized corporation are not as prevalent in cases involving contract creditors. By consenting
to do business with a corporation, the contract creditor may be said to have
assumed the risk of inadequate capitalization. Unlike the tort victim whose
contact with the corporation is usually unexpected and involuntary, the
contract creditor has an opportunity to discover and protect against thin
capitalization .13
The advantage ostensibly possessed by a contract creditor in his relationship with a corporation is a specious one, however, when evaluated in light
of the previously discussed rationale underlying limited shareholder liability
and the equities of proper loss allocation.1 0 If shareholders have not supplied
134.
135.

E. LATry, supra note 23, at 120.
See generally Note, The Incorporated Individual: A

Study of the One-Man

Company, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1373 (1938).
136. See generally Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts of
Their Corporations?, 76 YALE L.J. 1190 (1967).
137. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 4 (4th ed. 1971).
138. See Note, supra note 11.
139. See notes 14-15 supra.
140. Note, supra note 11.
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adequate risk capital, the quid pro quo for their limited liability is absent. In
addition, it is improper to place upon the creditor the burden of discovering
inadequate capitalization. There is no justification for permitting shareholders
to shift an even greater portion of the risk of corporate loss to the creditor.
Granting limited liability to shareholders who fail to provide an adequate
"special" fund to cover contingencies arising from their contracts permits
them to avoid a greater portion of risk than that envisioned by statutes permitting the existence of corporations. Thus, if adequate capital has not been
provided, the stockholders merit limited liability only if creditors are estopped
from asserting the doctrine of disregard by actual knowledge of the corporation's financial condition. If shareholders choose to provide inadequate
corporate capitalization, they should be required to inform potential creditors
of their corporation's financial condition or risk loss of their limited
liability.' 41 This would prevent creditors from relying on assumed corporate
solvency and permit them instead to rely on actual corporate financial conditions. If a corporation becomes insolvent as a result of normal business losses
rather than inadequate initial capitalization, then the corporation's creditors
cannot argue that they have been misled; they must instead bear the consequences of a situation they may reasonably be expected to have anticipated.
There is, of course, no exact formula for determining adequate capitalization, and even general standards present difficult problems. 42 Factors such as
corporate size as well as foreseeable hazards and risks of the particular business
should be considered. 143 Few businesses are entirely unique; consequently accountants can examine the financial structures of similar corporations to
arrive at a realistic determination of adequate capitalization for a particular
business.' 44 In the past, courts have been called upon to determine adequate
capitalization for businesses in utilizing the instrumentality rule 4 5 and
applying the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. 146 Although the problem
of measurement is difficult it is no harder than determining the reasonableness of standard business conduct in negligence suits. Therefore, because of
its inherent unfairness to creditors, inadequate capitalization should be considered a substantive wrong sufficient to justify application of the doctrine of
disregard in the absence of actual knowledge by the creditors.
141. E. LATrTY, supra note 23, at 128.
142. See note 144 infra.
143. E. LATrv, supra note 23, at 128.
144. See Auer v. Frank, 227 Cal. App. 2d 396, 409-10, 38 Cal. Rptr. 684, 692 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1964). The problem of defining inadequate capitalization is discussed in Note,
supra note 11, at 840-44. See also Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarist Process:
The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961). Similar business practice will
not, however, always be sufficient proof of adequate capitalization, especially if undercapitalization is a common practice in an industry. See note 57 supra.
145. Markow v. Alcock, 356 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1966) (applying Florida law).
146. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act provides: "Every conveyance made
without fair consideration when the person making it is engaged or is about to engage
in a business or transaction for which the property remaining in his hands after the conveyance is an unreasonably small capital is fraudulent as to creditors and as to other
persons who become creditors during the continuance of such business or transaction
without regard to his actual intent."
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